Abstract
Introduction
Along with the popularity of group-oriented communication systems, sensitive information sharing has brought substantial convenience for users. However, sensitive information confidentiality is an issue of growing importance for group members. To achieve confidential communication in a multicast channel, cryptographic keys are employed to secure the multicasted contents. The keys (or the group key) must be shared only by group members. Therefore, group key management is important for secure multicast group communication.
A central trusted authority, called a group controller (GC), is used to generate, distribute and update cryptographic keying material for group members to ensure multicast security through access control, data confidentiality and group authentication.
Historically, the first use of group keys was in the Second World War. Group keys were sent to groups of agents by the Special Operations Executive. These group keys allowed all the agents in a particular group to receive a single coded message [1] .
Modern group key management for sensitive information systems requires group keys to have a number of characteristics: group key secrecy, backward secrecy, forward secrecy and group key independency. In addition, modern management also requires flexible and efficient rekeying operations and privacy for group members [2] .
In order to fulfill these requirements, substantial research work has been carried out over the last decade. Projects include Conference Key Distribution Systems (CKDS) [3] , Scalable Multicast Key Distribution [4] , Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) [5, 6] , Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [7, 8] , Kronos [9] , Distributed Logical Key Hierarchy [10] , One-way Function Tree (OFT) [11] , Contributory Key Agreement [2] and Iolus [12] . Based on the way in which the group key is formed, these group key management systems can be classified into three approaches: contributory (distributed) key agreement, centralised key distribution and decentralized key distribution.
This paper extended our work in [22] , to formalize the proposed hybrid group key agreement, proof its correctness, and improve its security and efficiency. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 investigates existing approaches, main issues and limitations relating to sensitive information sharing protection. Section 3 proposes a hybrid group key agreement for sensitive information systems. Section 4 gives a formal and thorough security analysis and performance discussion. Section 5 concludes and provides future research directions.
This research contributes to the development of the body of knowledge surrounding sensitive information sharing protection. The proposed agreement achieves dynamic membership management for groups and individuals to access and share sensitive information and multicast communication secrecy. Also, it reaches strong privacy protection for individuals and flexible sensitive information delegation.
Centralised Group Key Management
Centralised key distribution requires a GC (or a key distribution centre (KDC)) to generate the group key and distribute the key to all group members. The earliest centralised key distribution was a star-shaped scheme in which all group members adopted their own secret keys to encrypt the group key with the GC when a rekeying event occurred. This process was inefficient in terms of communication, although it provided both forward and backward confidentiality and ease of implementation. According to Zou [15] , "among all group key management protocols, the key tree scheme provides a very powerful approach in centralised group key management".
Tree-based schemes have been independently proposed by several group researchers. The first such scheme was the logical key hierarchy (LKH) proposed by Wallner et al. [7, 16] . A scheme similar to LKH was proposed by Caronni et al. [17] and Noubir [18] . A more efficient scheme than LKH, based on the idea of a one-way function tree (OFT), was proposed by Sherman et al. [11] . Among the centralised key distribution schemes, LKH and OFT are the most popular.
In the LKH scheme, the associated binary tree is called a key tree. It is a virtual tree. GC maintains the multicast group in the key tree. All members of the group are associated with leaf nodes of the tree. The nodes in the tree are assigned keys. The key assigned to the root node is called Traffic Encryption Key (TEK). The key assigned to the other nodes is called the Key Encryption Key (KEK). Each member in the key tree can recognise keys if there is a path from the member to the root.
The computational cost of the rekeying operation is logarithmic to the size of the group (n members). Thus, the number of keys that needs to be changed in member join and leave operations is log( ) n . Also, this scheme requires a reliable multicast infrastructure, and it is scalable for large group size.
In a one-way function tree scheme (OFT), the associated binary tree is the same as for LKH. The scheme assumes that there is a secure unicast channel between the GC and each group member. The main advantage of OFT over LKH is that it allows group members to compute group keys locally to reduce the communication and computation cost.
The security of the system depends on the fact that each member knows the unblinded node keys on the path from its node to the root, and knows the blinded node keys that are siblings on its path to the root, and no other blinded nor unblinded keys. The purpose of blinded and unblinded keys is to allow group members to compute higher-level keys from lower-level keys in order to reduce the number of rekeying operations conducted by the GC.
OFT slightly outperforms LKH, but in terms of security, OFT is constrained by the limitations of its original design. Also, as all centralized key distribution 
Decentralized Group Key Management
Decentralized group key management is used to minimize the problems of centralized key distribution schemes, such as single-point failure. Under a decentralized system, key management is divided among hierarchically-structured managers, each with a small subgroup controller, in an attempt to concentrate the work in a single entity.
The earliest solution for decentralized key distribution was a core-based tree [4] . Further research followed, such as Iolus [12] , MARKS [19] , Kronos [9] and IGKMP [20] . Among these, the Iolus architecture is the most referenced scheme.
Iolus is a high-level infrastructure for secure multicast. It divides a large group into a number of subgroups. When a member joins or leaves a group, only the key of the subgroup to which the member belongs needs to be changed, while the keys of all other subgroups remain the same. Iolus relies on relay nodes for rekeying operations.
In Iolus, each subgroup has a controller named the group security agent (GSA) or group security intermediates (GSI). Every subgroup has its own independent key. The GSI of the root subgroup is called the group security controller (GSC). A GSI is a bridge between its parent subgroup and its own subgroup, and it holds both subgroup keys. Because each subgroup uses a different key, the GSIs are responsible for translating data from one key to another and delivering it to other GSIs as appropriate.
The major benefits of using a secure distribution tree are twofold. First, this architecture localizes the effect of group membership changes to one subgroup. Second, it overcomes the single-point failure effect. Should one GSI experience a system failure or security breach, only the breached subgroup loses services. The other subgroups continue to function.
Despite its advantages, Iolus suffers from several drawbacks. The Mayer and Rao survey [21] points out that Iolus requires a substantial resource overhead to manage a multicast group. Also, if the GSC fails, many of subgroups are cut off from each other. Decentralized key distribution schemes, such as Iolus, are therefore not suitable for large groups. In addition, the performance of such schemes is a challenge for multicast communication.
Summary
We In response to these limitations, we therefore propose a novel hybrid group key agreement for sensitive information systems to tackle the problems and challenges.
Hybrid Group Key Agreement for Sensitive Information Systems
The proposed agreement applies a hierarchical structure to secure multicast communication channel. The first key tree has been suggested in [16] for centralized group key distribution systems. As discussed in Section 2.2, centralized group key management is large group oriented, scalable and operation efficient, thus, this component adopts and extends the key tree T. It is a top-down structure and consists of a root, subgroups ( SG ), clusters ( C ) and leaves (associated with users U ).
Every user owns or shares sensitive information. To protect sensitive information, the security of each single user needs to be scrutinized. In order to protect the privacy of each individual, U is categorized into two groups: passive users, ω , and active users, ϖ . ω is a set of passive users in the system, that is inert and infrequently joins and leaves the system. In SecureSIS, ω does not share its own sensitive information with others, but accesses the sensitive information of ϖ . ϖ is a set of active users in the system, that is vigorously and frequently joins and leaves the system. In Novel Hybrid Group Key Agreement for Sensitive Information Systems Xianping Wu, Huy Hoang Ngo, Phu Dung Le, Bala Srinivasan, Huamei Qi SecureSIS, ϖ needs to share sensitive information with ω therefore, it needs high privacy protection.
The passive users ω are initially aggregated into clusters, at the upper level, called subgroups. Each cluster selects one of its members as the cluster leader to be the representative. The active users ϖ cannot join clusters, but virtual clusters. Each virtual cluster is a virtual container to accommodate involved ω and ϖ . When an active user joins, a member (passive user) of a closed cluster forms a virtual cluster under the same subgroup node. The member (passive user) is called virtual leader for the virtual cluster. Formally: { } T root SG C U =    The hybrid group key agreement is characterized as follows:
− VC (virtual cluster) is a set composed of virtual containers to accommodate involved ω and ϖ . An active user can only join (belong to) one virtual cluster; however, a passive user can belong to a subset of virtual clusters, such that, ,
, :
is a set composed of leaders L ⊂ ω for authentication as representatives of clusters. − VL (virtual leader) is a set composed of virtual leaders L ⊂ ω for constructing virtual clusters and managing key operations. − ( ) Alg U is a suite of algorithms that manages U join and leave rekeying operations.
Key Tree Structure
As discussed in Section 2, since the drawbacks of the existing multicast communication channel approaches. The Hybrid Group Key Agreement (HGKM) must guarantee privacy protection for group members and confidentiality for sensitive information systems. It must also be suitable for groups with a large number of members.
In order to protect the privacy of individuals in sensitive information systems, HGKM categorizes group members U into active users ϖ and passive users ω . Also, several new concepts are introduced. Meanwhile, each virtual cluster is formed by a passive user as a leader, and each virtual cluster is able to contain only one active user but one, or more than one, passive user.
In addition, in accordance with key tree and Definition 3.1, HGKM is a two-tier hybrid group key management that focuses on privacy protection and confidentiality of sensitive information. Figure 3 .1 depicts the logical structure of HGKM. It is divided into two levels: the passive user level and the active user level. The passive user level consists only of passive users who participate in sensitive information sharing and accessing of other active users. As mentioned, if a passive user wants to share its sensitive information, the user must transform into an active user. The active user level employs a group key tree distribution scheme; it is formed by one active user and several passive users. Meanwhile, one passive user is promoted to leader to construct a virtual cluster. Each virtual cluster has only one active user, and a passive user can belong to multiple virtual clusters. The key management of this level is conducted by a contributory group key management scheme. According to the key structure, HGKM is presented as tree-based group key management. However, when a j ϖ ∈ ϖ joins the system, one of i ω ∈ ω will reconstruct a dynamic virtual cluster under the subgroup. The logical structure of HGKM can be built in two steps: − During the group initiation phase, a key tree is set up for the passive user level. Passive members are assigned into this level. − After the passive user level initialization is completed, active users are assigned into the active user level and a key ring is built for each active user. Meanwhile, a leader is selected from the passive users and assigned to the virtual cluster. In this section, the key structure of HGKM was presented. In the next section, the security properties of HGKM will be given.
HGKM Cryptographic Properties
A comprehensive group key agreement solution must handle adjustments to group secrets subsequent to all membership change operations in the underlying group communication system. In order to guarantee the security of multicasting content, the proposed HGKM must have − desired properties. Key freshness is one of the most important requirements to group key management together with following properties extended from Kim and Perrig et al. [2] : − Group Key Secrecy -guarantees that it is computationally infeasible for a passive adversary to discover any group key.
− Forward Secrecy -guarantees that a passive adversary who knows a contiguous subset of previous group keys cannot discover subsequent group keys.
− Backward Secrecy -guarantees that a passive adversary who knows a contiguous subset of group keys cannot discover preceding group keys. Key Independence -guarantees that a passive adversary who knows any proper subset of group keys cannot discover any other group key. Since the proposed HGKM is a hybrid group key management scheme, the passive user level employs group key tree management while the active user level adopts contributory group key management. The following notable features are associated with all protocols:
− Each passive group member receives a group key. The key is computed and distributed under the same protocol. − Each active group member contributes an equal secret to a group key (virtual cluster key). The key is computed as a function of all current group members' secrets. − For active group members, each secret is private and is never revealed to other members. − All protocol messages are sequence-numbered. This section gave the security properties of group keys. Next section, the generation of group keys in HGKM will be discussed.
Group Keys
Group keys are used to secure communications. The proposed hybrid group key management adopts contributory and group key tree agreements. Therefore, two algorithms are needed to generate group keys. For a passive user, group key tree management is applied, and a GC generates random group keys for members. However, for an active user, contributory key management is applied.
As defined, active users can only belong to virtual clusters. Thus, the algorithm for generating a key for a virtual cluster requires all involved entities to contribute their secrets. The virtual cluster key generation algorithm is described in more detail as follows:
Assume . This section presented a virtual cluster key generation algorithm for HGKM. In the next section, member key operations, such as join and leave, will be discussed.
Member Join
Join is the procedure invoked by a user who wishes to become a member of a multicast group. In HGKM, users are categorized into passive and active users. Also, active users can only join virtual clusters. Therefore, there are three scenarios: an active user joins the system, a passive user joins a cluster and a passive user joins an existing virtual cluster. These scenarios are illustrated in Figure 3 .2. 
Active User Joins
When an active user ( 1 ϖ in Figure 3. 3) wishes to join the group, it applies the active user level key distribution agreement. According to Definition 3.1, it does not need backward secrecy and the join procedure starts with an active user join request.
− When an active user joins, a new virtual cluster is created and a virtual cluster key is contributed by all group members. Also, a passive user is chosen as the leader of the created virtual cluster. The passive user (leader) has all relevant group keys (for example, 1 ω has subgroup1 key subgroup1 K and root root K ).
Furthermore, the GC knows the new virtual cluster key. Consequently, the rekeying operation does not take place. In other words, an active user join action does not affect whole group, and the virtual cluster leader takes responsibility for sensitive information forwarding.
Passive User Joins Cluster.
When a passive user (for example, 4 ω in Figure 3.4) wants to join the group, it applies the passive user level key distribution agreement. Backward secrecy must be guaranteed to prevent the new member from accessing previous group communications. The join procedure starts with passive user join request:
ω contacts the nearby GC. 
When a passive user joins the group, it triggers a group key tree management scheme and a rekeying operation is incurred. The same process applies to passive users joining multiple and virtual clusters.
Passive User Joins Existing Virtual Cluster
If a passive user ( m ω in Figure 3.3 No matter whether the joining user is active or passive, if the user wishes to join a virtual cluster, contributory group key management is applied. Therefore, no rekeying operation occurs. To protect the privacy of active users, when a passive user wants to join an existing virtual cluster, the passive user needs access permission from the active user in the virtual cluster. 
Member Leave
Leave is the operation invoked by a group member who wishes to leave the multicast group. Similar to the join operation, there are three scenarios for the member leave operation: an active user leaves the system, a passive user leaves the system or a passive user leaves an existing virtual cluster. These scenarios are illustrated in Figure 3 .5.
Active User Leaves
Suppose an active user ( 1 ϖ in Figure 3. 3) wants to leave the system. It does not need forward secrecy, because virtual clusters are containers for active users (Definition 3.1). When the active user leaves, the virtual cluster n vc VC ∈ is destroyed. The leave procedure starts with active user leave request. the virtual cluster has been invalidated and is no longer available and that the virtual cluster key will be removed from each member. Precisely:
The concept of virtual clusters focuses on active users. Each virtual cluster has only one active user and it is the existence of the active user that determines the virtual cluster. Virtual clusters allow active users to frequently visit their sensitive information and share their information with authorized passive users. When the active user leaves the virtual cluster, the cluster is destroyed.
Passive User Leaves Cluster
If a passive user (for example, 4 ω in Figure 3.4) wants to leave cluster 2 (say 2 c ), it needs to apply a passive user level key distribution agreement. Forward secrecy must be guaranteed to prevent the leaving user 
When a passive user leaves a cluster, it triggers a group key tree management scheme and a rekeying operation takes place. For forward secrecy, the new group keys are unicast to the involved cluster members in 2 c to secure key materials. The security of HGKM is therefore guaranteed.
Passive User Leaves Existing Virtual Cluster
If a passive user (for example, 3 ω in Figure 3.3) wants to leave the virtual cluster n vc , the virtual cluster will not be destroyed (which is the case should an active member leave). However, to ensure backward secrecy, the virtual cluster key needs to be updated. This action does not affect other group members.
− First, 3 ω sends a leave request to the leader 1 ω . − The GC then triggers the virtual cluster key generation algorithm to generate a new virtual cluster keys with existing members in n vc . Passive users leaving several virtual clusters at the same time follow the procedure for this algorithm. However, when the passive user wants to leave the system, the procedure will apply group key tree management. Because the passive user does not "provide" sensitive information for virtual cluster members, the passive user does not have any impact on the virtual cluster. For forward secrecy, only a new virtual cluster key is required.
This section introduced member leave operations for passive and active users in HGKM. From a security aspect, group keys are threatened if no rekeying operation occurs in a particular period. The next section therefore introduces periodic rekeying operations to overcome this security threat.
Periodic Rekeying Operation
The periodic rekeying operation is a process to renew group keys in the system for security purposes. It does not relate to either join or leave key operations. After a period of time, the group keys become vulnerable to key compromise and cryptanalysis attacks. This operation helps the system to reduce those risks.
Because active users know virtual cluster keys rather than group keys the periodic rekeying operation applies to passive users only. It also employs group key tree management. For example, if the last rekeying operation ( it refers to a passive user join or leave operation.) occurred at time t and a passive user has a life cycle 1 2 [ , ] t t , then 1 2 t t t ≤ < , as illustrated in 
Security and Performance Discussion
From above description of the proposed work, in this section, we first give a security analysis by proving theorems. Then privacy protection is argued. Finally, we discuss rekeying complexities comparing with others group key agreements.
HGKM Security Discussion
For protecting sensitive information confidentiality among group members, one of the most important features is key freshness. It guarantees that the key is new, and an adversary does not know it to compromise the shield of sensitive information systems. Therefore, the security of group communications relies on the group key management. Kim et al [2] suggests verifying a secure protocol for group communication that should base on group key secrecy, forwards secrecy and backward secrecy. Therefore, the follows are discussed.
Group Key Secrecy
Group key secrecy, as defined in Section 3.2, renders the discovery of any group key computationally infeasible for a passive adversary. In HGKM , group keys are generated by the GC randomly in the passive user tier; this guarantees group key secrecy. However, in the active user tier, all active users belong to virtual clusters, and contributory group key management is applied to secure multicasting critical contents. The discussion in Section 3.3 on group keys gives an algorithm that generates virtual cluster keys for all involved members; a corollary can now be devised to show that HGKM also has a group key secrecy feature. 
Thus we have:
According to ( ; ) ( | ) ( ) Pr A B Pr A B Pr B = ⋅ , so:
The contributed secret random and the special function (.) f ensure that the probability of generating
In other words, the generated intermediate key is 
Combined with (3), we have:
Also, because
There are n intermediate keys in n vc , so, given an intermediate key, the probability of guessing
However, when the special one-way function (.) f is applied, this makes it harder for an adversary to work out the 1 ( ... )
Thus, combining (6) and (8), we have:
Because the large prime number p is the key space of vc K , the maximum security of ( | )
The contributed virtual cluster key
] p -1 . The contributed virtual cluster key is computationally infeasible; the proof is complete. □
Forward Secrecy
Forward secrecy, as defined in Section 3.2, guarantees that knowledge of a contiguous subset of old group keys will not enable the discovery of any subsequent group keys. In other words, forward secrecy prevents users who have left the group from accessing future group communication. Forward secrecy is demonstrated in the active user tier by the member leave operation.
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In the active user leave operation, each virtual cluster has only one active user and the existence of the active user determines the existence of the virtual cluster. When the active user leaves the virtual cluster, the cluster is destroyed. Operations involving active users consequently do not need forward secrecy. However, when a passive user leaves an existing virtual cluster, forward secrecy is necessary. As described in Section 3.5, a corollary can be made. Corollary 4.2 Forward secrecy is guaranteed in virtual clusters. Proof: Suppose n ω is a former virtual cluster member. Whenever a leaving event occurs as a result of a passive user leaving an existing virtual cluster operation, a new vc K is refreshed, and all keys known to leaving member n ω will be changed accordingly. ω has the same level of information of the new virtual cluster key as an adversary. Forward secrecy is satisfied in operations involving virtual clusters; the proof is complete.
Backward Secrecy
Backward secrecy, as defined in Section 3.2, ensures that a new member who knows the current group key cannot derive any previous group key. In other words, backward secrecy prevents new joining users from accessing previous group content. Backward secrecy is achieved in the active user tier through the member join operation (described in Section 3.4).
In the active user join operation, when an active user joins the group, a new virtual cluster is created and consequently there are no previous virtual cluster keys to be taken into consideration; in this situation, backward secrecy is not a concern. However, when a passive user joins an existing virtual cluster operation, backward secrecy needs to be considered. As described in Section 3.4, a corollary can be made. 
Collusion Resistance
Collusion attack refers to a situation where any set of departing members work together to regain the current group key by applying the old keying materials known by them. Collusion resistance in HGKM ensures that previous virtual cluster passive users cannot collude and determine the current virtual cluster keys. The privacy of current active users of the virtual cluster is protected because the previous virtual cluster users cannot collude to identify the current key. Therefore, a collusion resistance corollary for HGKM can be made. 
Because previous passive users know their key materials, the uncertainty of their key materials is:
and the uncertainty of the new cluster key and their key materials is:
Then, taking (3) and (4) into (2) we have:
The uncertainty of knowing the new virtual cluster key through former key materials of k passive users is same as the uncertainty of the new virtual cluster key. According to Corollary 4.2, forward secrecy is guaranteed in virtual clusters and the new virtual cluster key is secure. An adversary can no more gain access to the current virtual cluster key than can the k previous passive users; the proof is complete.
Privacy Discussion
Privacy Protection is the ability of individuals in group key management to seclude or reveal their own sensitive information selectively. As discussed in Section 2 that neither tree-based nor contributory group key managements consider privacy protection for individuals. All members share information securely, and individuals cannot manage their own sensitive information in systems. However, HGKM employs virtual clusters to secure the sensitive information of active users, and allows only one active user in one virtual cluster. Compared to other key management schemes, HGKM provides greater privacy protection.
Complexity Discussion
In this section, we use communication, computation and storage complexities to measure performance of the proposed work.
For passive users, ω , the complexities of rekeying are same as the centralised group key agreement (e.g. LKH), however, active users, ϖ , virtual cluster reduces the communication complexity of rekeying operations to zero, due to the proposed scheme does not need update net keys when an i ϖ joins or leaves, because the leader constructs a VC with new key which is shared by all VC members and the leader knows group, subgroup, node and cluster keys, so the leader can decipher the information via networks and re-dispatch the information to VC members encrypted with the VC key.
The comparison of proposed work (HGKM) to logical key hierarchy (LKH) is summarized in the table 4.1. The entries indicate the number of messages, cryptographic operations and keys required, and the following notations are used:
− P,A,L : Passive users, Active users and Leaders, respectively. − n : the number of members in the subgroup. − m : the size of the cluster. − / x y : 'x' denotes the cost of the requesting users to join or leave, and 'y' denotes the cost of other users. − d : height of the tree, for the balanced tree, d=log α − n, n is the number of members. a : the degree of the tree. − s n : the number of subgroups. − H,D,E : one-way Hash, Decryption and Encryption functions, respectively. 1D/1H  1D  1H  2  j+1  A  1D/1H  0  1H  L  1E/1H  1E  1H   From the table 4 .1, we can see that our proposed scheme has advantages over the LKH in term of rekeying complexity. To an active user, it does not involve rekeying operations for joining and leaving. In other words, it does not trigger key updating events through group key server to reduce the load of systems. In addition, the every active user has own VC, it makes the sensitive information of active users more secure; no other active users can access it. Therefore, the scheme is suitable for the sensitive information sharing which needs group communication securely and efficiently.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have pointed out the problems of privacy protection and confidentiality of sensitive information for group communication. Then a novel hybrid group key management scheme is proposed to overcome the problems. It reduces the complexities of rekeying operations on key server comparing to the LHK. Moreover, it defences privacy for group users against unsanctioned invasion. The security analyses and mathematical proofs have shown that the proposed scheme guarantees the confidentiality of sharing sensitive information among the group members.
As future work, we aim to adopt dynamic key generation technique to improve security of sensitive information systems.
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